A Thomistic Approach to the Gettier Problem (R. Di Ceglie)

R. Di Ceglie, A Thomistic Approach to the Gettier Problem in Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (volume 15, Number 7, 2026)

Condividiamo un articolo del nostro socio R. Di Ceglie, A Thomistic Approach to the Gettier Problem, sulla prestigiosa rivista Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (volume 15, Number 7, 2026).

 

ABSTRACT

Epistemologists have been discussing the Gettier problem (GP) for 60 years. Numerous proposals have been suggested to solve it. In this article, I argue that the problem can be dismissed if we consider it in light of Thomas Aquinas’s view of truth. According to Aquinas, there are two types of truth: ‘ontological’ and ‘logical’. Unlike the latter, only God can possess the former. My argument is that the GP arises due to the implicit use of the former type of truth; the latter type, typically possessed by humans, would prevent the GP from arising.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v15i7.6660

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ultimo aggiornamento: 12 Giu 2026

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